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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Stark asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because
the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that he in particular had been engaged
in criminal activity. Under the totality of the circumstances here, the officers did not have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting Mr. Stark—the particular person actually
stopped—of criminal activity.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues the district court correctly determined the
officers’ suspicion that it was another person, Justin Burns, driving the car was reasonable. (See
Resp. Br., p.5.)

The officers suspected Mr. Burns of having an outstanding warrant and

committing criminal activity. The State contends that this “mistaken identity” did not negate
reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop of the car Mr. Stark was driving. (See Resp. Br., p.6.)
This Reply Brief is necessary because the State did not present a mistaken identity
argument to the district court. Thus, under State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017), the
State’s mistaken identity argument on appeal should not be considered by this Court. And even
if the mistaken identity argument could be considered here, the officers did not reasonably
mistake Mr. Stark for Mr. Burns. The officers did not see Mr. Stark before initiating the traffic
stop and compare his features to those of Mr. Burns, and there was no showing that Mr. Stark
looked like Mr. Burns. The officers’ unreasonable mistake, alongside the rest of the totality of
the circumstances, did not provide the officers with a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting Mr. Stark of criminal activity, and the officers did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify the traffic stop.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Stark’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stark’s motion to suppress, because the officers did
not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that he in particular had been engaged in
criminal activity?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stark’s Motion To Suppress, Because The Officers
Did Not Have Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That He In Particular Had Been Engaged In
Criminal Activity
A.

Introduction
Mr. Stark asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because

the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that he in particular had been engaged
in criminal activity. Under the totality of the circumstances here, the officers did not have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting Mr. Stark—the particular person actually
stopped—of criminal activity. Thus, the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion
to justify the traffic stop of Mr. Stark.

Without an applicable exception to the warrant

requirement, the traffic stop as a warrantless seizure was unlawful. Thus, the district court
should have granted Mr. Stark’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the
illegal warrantless seizure.

B.

The Officers Did Not Have A Particularized And Objective Basis For Suspecting
Mr. Stark Of Criminal Activity
Mr. Stark asserts the officers, taking into account the totality of the circumstances here,

did not have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting him of criminal activity. See
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). Thus, the officers did not have reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop of Mr. Stark. See State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585,
588 (2018).
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1.

The Court Should Not Consider The State’s Mistaken Identity Argument On
Appeal, Because The State Did Not Present A Mistaken Identity Argument To
The District Court

The Court should not consider the State’s “mistaken identity” argument on appeal,
because the State did not present a mistaken identity argument to the district court. In its
Respondent’s Brief, the State argues, “The district court concluded that the officer’s suspicion
that [Mr.] Burns was driving the car, based upon evidence that [Mr.] Burns had been driving the
car at least three times in the past three months in the same general area, was reasonable.”
(Resp. Br., p.7.) According to the State, the district court “did not err by concluding the officer’s
suspicion that [Mr. Burns] was driving the car, although ultimately incorrect, was reasonable.”
(Resp. Br., p.7.) Put otherwise, the State contends, “[t]he district court did not err by concluding
the mistaken identity did not render the initial traffic stop constitutionally unreasonable.” (Resp.
Br., p.7.)

However, the State makes this “mistaken identity” argument for the first time

on appeal.
The United States Supreme Court set out the law for mistaken identity arrests in Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). The Hill Court found no reason to disturb the conclusion of the
California appellate courts “that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and
when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second
party is a valid arrest.” Id. at 802. The Idaho Court of Appeals, citing Hill, later observed that “a
search incident to an arrest may be lawful even though the arrest was made of the wrong person
where the police were reasonable in their mistaken belief as to the identity of the arrestee.”
State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 125 (Ct. App. 1999). Courts in other jurisdictions have
applied Hill in the context of reasonable suspicion for a limited detention, like the traffic stop at
issue here. See, e.g., State v. Lawton, 94 P.3d 154, 156 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
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But Mr. Stark remembers what the State argued before the district court. The State did
not present to the district court any such mistaken identity arguments—i.e., that the officers had
reasonably mistaken Mr. Stark for Mr. Burns. Rather, the State merely argued in opposition to
Mr. Stark’s motion to suppress that “Officer Barghoorn had reasonable articulable suspicion that
(1) the vehicle had been involved in criminal activity . . . and (2) that the driver was a wanted
person.” (See R., p.50.) The State contended the officer “believed the wanted person who had
committed those crimes was driving the Saturn.” (R., p.51.) Likewise, at the motion to suppress
hearing, the State argued, “In this case Officer Barghoorn believed that Justin Burns was driving
the vehicle. He believed or knew he was a wanted individual from IDOC. He also knew that he
had engaged in criminal activity.” (Tr., p.44, Ls.22-25.)
The State’s actual argument before the district court, that the officers had reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Burns was driving the car, is a step removed from a mistaken identity
argument that the officers had reasonably mistaken Mr. Stark for Mr. Burns. If anything, the
State’s argument before the district court was that the officers reasonably believed Mr. Burns
was driving, despite the officers’ failure to identify the driver. Thus, the State did not present a
mistaken identity argument to the district court. See Hill, 401 U.S. at 802.
Because the State did not present a mistaken identity argument to the district court, this
Court should not consider the State’s mistaken identity argument on appeal. The Idaho Supreme
Court has a “longstanding and recently re-affirmed policy of requiring parties to present their
arguments to the court below.” State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017). As the Idaho
Supreme Court explained in State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017), “[i]ssues not
raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the
theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at
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275; see McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 125 (“Because this is a theory that was not advanced by the
prosecutor at the suppression hearing, McCarthy had no opportunity to respond through evidence
and the magistrate did not address it in his findings. Consequently, we will not consider it.”).
Under Garcia-Rodriguez, because the State did not raise its mistaken identity argument before
the district court, this Court should not consider the issue on appeal.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that, while “ordinarily issues cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal,” an exception to that rule “has been applied by this Court when the issue
was argued to or decided by the trial court.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998). But
DuValt does not apply here to save the State’s mistaken identity argument raised for the first
time on appeal, because the district court did not decide the mistaken identity issue. Rather, the
district court’s determinations closely followed the State’s arguments on the officers’ belief that
Mr. Burns was driving the car, despite the officers’ failure to identify the driver. Specifically,
the district court determined “the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Justin Burns
was inside the vehicle,” subject to an outstanding warrant, and had committed eluding and/or
drug offenses. (Tr., p.60, Ls.9-17.) The district court did not decide the mistaken identity issue,
i.e., whether the officers had reasonably mistaken Mr. Stark for Mr. Burns.
The State did not present a mistaken identity argument to the district court. Thus, this
Court should not consider the State’s mistaken identity argument on appeal.

2.

The Officers Did Not Reasonably Mistake Mr. Stark For Mr. Burns

Even if the State’s mistaken identity argument could be considered here, the officers did
not reasonably mistake Mr. Stark for Mr. Burns. Before initiating the traffic stop, the officers
did not see Mr. Stark and compare his features to those of Mr. Burns, and there was no showing
that Mr. Stark looked like Mr. Burns.
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Unlike the instant case, in cases where courts in other jurisdictions have held mistaken
identity did not negate probable cause for an arrest or reasonable suspicion for a detention of a
person, the officers saw the person before the arrest or detention, and the person arrested or
detained resembled the suspect sought by the officers. For example, in Hill, the leading case on
mistaken identity arrests, the United States Supreme Court found, “The police unquestionably
had probable cause to arrest Hill; they also had his address and a verified description.” Hill, 401
U.S. at 802-03. The mailbox at the address listed Hill as the apartment’s occupant. Id. at 803.
The Hill Court found, “Upon gaining entry to the apartment, they were confronted with one who
fit the description of Hill received from various sources.” Id.
While “[t]hat person claimed he was Miller, not Hill,” the Hill Court observed, “aliases
and false identifications are not uncommon.” Id. Further, the door had a lock and Miller’s
explanation for how he entered the apartment was not convincing, and he denied knowledge of
firearms in the apartment even though a pistol was in plain view. See id. Thus, “the officers in
good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him.” Id. at 803-04. The Hill Court cautioned
that subjective good-faith belief would not in itself justify the arrest, but held “sufficient
probability, not certainty is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and
on the record before us the officers’ mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable
response to the situation facing them at the time.” Id. at 804.
Similarly, in United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 1996), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held it could not conclude an FBI agent’s misidentification of
Mr. Lang as one Mr. Phommachanh was unreasonable. Lang, 81 F.3d at 966. The agent in Lang
was part of a task force investigating Mr. Phommachanh’s involvement in several robberies and
a murder. See id. at 965. Mr. Lang was the passenger in a Blazer stopped by the agent, because
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the agent believed Mr. Lang was Mr. Phommachanh. See id. at 959-60. The agent had a mug
shot and description of Mr. Phommachanh, but had not seen him in person. See id. at 966.
Mr. Lang argued the mistake of identity was unreasonable because of the physical
dissimilarities between himself and Mr. Phommachanh, including height, weight, and hairstyle.
Id. at 966. However, the agent testified he had approximately ten seconds to observe Mr. Lang
walking between a mobile home and the Blazer, from a distance of fifty to seventy yards. See id.
The Lang Court also found that the agent “observed [Mr. Lang] by driving alongside the Blazer
and making a visual comparison between the mug shot pictures and the physical features of the
vehicle’s passenger.” Id. The Tenth Circuit noted, “The brief time period and the difficulty of
identifying someone in a moving vehicle must be taken into consideration in evaluating the
reasonableness of [the agent’s] mistake.” Id. Additionally, “the district court specifically found
the mug shot picture of Mr. Phommachanh ‘looked very much like [Mr. Lang].’” Id.
The Lang Court next found the agent “had the best opportunity” to compare Mr. Lang’s
facial features with the mug shot, and his opportunity to compare Mr. Lang’s height and weight
to the suspect’s was hindered by the limited time period he saw Mr. Lang outside the mobile
home, and Mr. Lang’s seated position in the vehicle. Id. The Lang Court held: “Under the
totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude [the agent’s] misidentification of [Mr. Lang] as
Mr. Phommachanh was unreasonable. Accordingly, we hold the Task Force possessed sufficient
justification to stop the Blazer.” Id.
Further, in United States v. Neeman, 61 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb. 1999), officers
executed a valid traffic stop when they stopped the defendant’s vehicle in reliance on a request
from a deputy United States marshal, even though the deputy marshal was mistaken about the
identify of a passenger in the vehicle. See Neeman, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 946-47, 950-51. In
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Neeman, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska found that when the deputy
marshal requested that the defendant’s vehicle be stopped, he possessed the following objective
facts: “First, he knew that an individual named Richard Maher was wanted for violating the
terms of his pretrial release. Second, he saw a man, whom he believed to be Mr. Maher, but later
determined to be Gary Borland, leave a residence on North 70th Street, where he believed Maher
was staying.” Id. at 950-51.
The Neeman Court held that, although the deputy marshal “was not entirely sure that the
passenger was Mr. Maher, considering that it was dark, the passenger had a hat on, and the fact
that Mr. Maher and the passenger, Gary Borland, look remarkably similar, especially with
Borland wearing a hat, I conclude that it was reasonable for [the deputy marshal] to believe that
the passenger in the vehicle was Maher.” Id. at 951. The Court held that the deputy marshal’s
belief “provided the requisite ‘reasonable suspicion’ to stop the vehicle to determine whether the
passenger was Mr. Maher.” Id.
In contrast to Hill, Lang, and Neeman, the officers here did not see Mr. Stark and
compare his features to those of Mr. Burns, and there was no showing that Mr. Stark looked like
Mr. Burns. Officer Barghoorn did not see who was driving the car on February 20 before
initiating the traffic stop. Rather, on cross-examination, when asked, “So essentially you did not
see who was driving the vehicle before the seizure?”, the officer ultimately answered, “Yes, that
is correct.” (Tr., p.40, Ls.11-15.) Officer Barghoorn initiated the traffic stop. (Tr., p.23, Ls.1920.) Thus, unlike the officers in Hill and the agent in Lang, the officers in the instant case made
no effort to compare Mr. Stark’s appearance to the description or images of Mr. Burns. See Hill,
401 U.S. at 803; Lang, 81 F.3d at 966.
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Conversely, Officer Barghoorn had confirmed that Mr. Burns was driving the car during
the previous February 8 encounter. The district court found the officer on February 8 had
positioned “himself in such a way that he can see who the driver is on this occasion, and he sees
that it is the same person that he understands to be Justin Burns based on the investigation he did
in relation to the December 7 incident.” (See Tr., p.53, Ls.15-20.)

But Officer Barghoorn on

February 20 made no such efforts to compare Mr. Stark’s facial features with those of Mr. Burns,
or to otherwise identify the driver as Mr. Burns, before stopping Mr. Stark.
Moreover, the district court here did not find that Mr. Stark resembled Mr. Burns in
appearance. (See Tr., p.50, L.25 – p.61, L.23.) By the time of the February 20 traffic stop,
Officer Barghoorn knew what Mr. Burns looked like, based on Mr. Burns’s images on an
identification card and in a surveillance video. (See Tr., p.52, Ls.2-20.) As discussed above, the
officer had also confirmed that Mr. Burns was driving the car during the February 8 encounter.
(See Tr., p.53, Ls.15-20.) But unlike the officers in Hill, Officer Barghoorn and the other
officers never saw Mr. Stark before initiating the traffic stop, meaning they never determined
Mr. Stark “fit the description” of Mr. Burns. See Hill, 401 U.S. at 803. Further, unlike the
district courts in Lang or Neeman, the district court in the instant case never determined that
Mr. Stark looked like Mr. Burns. See Lang, 81 F.3d at 966; Neeman, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 950-51.
Because the officers here did not see Mr. Stark and compare his features to those of
Mr. Burns, and there was no showing that Mr. Stark looked like Mr. Burns, the officers did not
reasonably mistake Mr. Stark for Mr. Burns. See, e.g., Hill, 401 U.S. at 802-04. What the
officers did was fail to identify the driver before stopping Mr. Stark, and that failure to identify
did not render their mistake reasonable.
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The officers’ unreasonable mistake, alongside the rest of the totality of the circumstances
here, did not provide the officers with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
Mr. Stark of criminal activity. At the time of the traffic stop, the officers knew about Mr. Burns,
his outstanding warrant, and his potential criminal activity. (See App. Br., pp.12-13.) But the
officers had last seen Mr. Burns drive the car, which belonged to someone else, twelve days
before the traffic stop; they did not know who was driving the car at the time; and they had not
seen the car’s driver commit any traffic violations that day. (See App. Br., pp.13-14.)
Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, including the officers’ unreasonable
mistake, the officers did not have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Mr. Stark of
criminal activity.

See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.

The officers did not have reasonable,

articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop of Mr. Stark. Without an applicable exception to
the warrant requirement, the traffic stop as a warrantless seizure was unlawful. See State v.
Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 640 (2003). Mr. Stark’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a
result of the illegal warrantless seizure should have been granted. See State v. Frederick, 149
Idaho 509, 515 (2010).

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Stark respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of judgment and
commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 12th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of June, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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